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Child care has steadily become a commanding political issue in Japan. The govern-
ment reversed policy in the early 1990s, moving from neglect of the child care system to
seeking to expand and improve it, mainly in the hope that improving women’s economic
opportunities would bring about an increase in the birthrate. Despite considerable expan-
sion, however, waiting lists for slots in licensed centers, which are much cheaper and bet-
ter than unlicensed centers, have remained conspicuous. Japan’s conservative govern-
ments have at times tried to use child care service waiting lists as policymaking bench-
marks, but this approach has backfired politically, as the lists have instead become
flashpoints for criticizing government policy. In early 2016, the issue flared dramatically
because of a near-perfect storm of rising expectations, severe underfunding, growing fi-
nancial (and other) stress on families, and a chance blog by a frustrated mother that trig-
gered a new round of policymaking promises.
This report suggests that Japan’s child care problem is multilayered. First and most ob-
viously, construction of new facilities is well behind demand, leading to angry outbursts
from frustrated parents along with some opportunistic posturing by opposition parties.
However, professional observers are primarily concerned that quality of care is suffering
because the current policy course emphasizes deregulation to hold down costs and encour-
age private sector participation in child care. As a result, most childcare workers suffer
poor treatment, leading to a vicious cycle of overworked staff, a growing number of under-
or untrained staff, and high quit rates, including the loss of many of the veteran caregiv-
ers needed to make care services safe and reliable. This is largely a controversy about
money, since the central government has continued to hold down spending on child care
even as it attempts to bolster the sector. Japan’s child care services have always been well-
respected, despite rather marginal funding, but some recent sources give reason to be-
lieve that continued under-spending, especially combined with rapid expansion, could
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entail severe social as well as economic costs.
Part 1 Background
With pressure on women to work growing, and opportunity to pursue professional op-
portunities improving as well, there is rising demand for child care support. There are
also worsening social pressures that call for better child care support, including rising
child poverty. Meanwhile, weakening family and community support mean that many
parents have trouble learning how to do proper child care. Researchers and specialists
point to rising levels of children needing special care, and of families, such as single-
parent families, needing greater assistance (e.g., Kawamura 2015:89-92). Many of the coun-
try’s most vulnerable employees are in dire need of good child care support. The number
of single mother-led families is increasing rapidly, and most are mired in poverty. The
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) calculates the average income of a sin-
gle mother-led family is at just 44 percent of the national average even though most sin-
gle mothers work (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2016.01.12 online). In addition, it is expected
that in a few years some 14 percent of mothers will be pressed into so-called double-care,
or caring for both young children and infirm older relatives, up from recent levels of
around eight percent (Nihon Keizai Shinbun 2016.01.04, evening edition, page 14). Fi-
nally, the above factors, along with the financial or emotional stress felt by some fami-
lies, have allegedly triggered a steep rise in child abuse, especially if a large number of al-
leged improperly classified deaths are factored in (Japan Times 2016.04.08). Well quali-
fied child care workers are of course a vital first line of defense in alleviating such prob-
lems.
Japan is experiencing a severe shortage of child care facilities, but this is predomi-
nantly a big-city problem. In April 2015, for example, 23,167 children were on the na-
tional wait list, with 7814, or 34 percent, of them in Tokyo. Osaka, Saitama Prefecture,
and Yokohama are other areas with large waiting lists of children. In regional cities, in
contrast, many centers have been shutting down or consolidating as populations have be-
gun shrinking.
The heightened importance placed on women’s work and the pledges of the current
Abe Shinzo Government have triggered a “construction rush” to build new centers, and
it has brought attention to another longstanding problem, namely a worsening shortage
of childcare workers. Demand for childcare workers reached 5.72 positions per available
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worker in Tokyo in November 2015. The worker shortage results mainly from long-
recognized weaknesses in the nation’s employment system, especially the long work
hours common to Japanese workplaces, and the difficulty that many or most women expe-
rience in getting maternity leave. As we shall see, these conditions drive many qualified
and/or veteran childcare workers out of the industry, but it is primarily a systemic prob-
lem. First, long work hours mean that hundreds of thousands of working parents need ex-
tended child care services (encho hoiku), greatly raising the costs of care. Second, many
women experience difficulty in getting childcare leave - differently stated, strong pres-
sure to return quickly to their jobs, generally on a full-time basis. This results in heavy de-
mand for care for infants, who require many more staff than older pre-school children,
again at disproportionately high cost. A survey by the MHLW (cited in Kobayashi
2015:20) indicates that 85 percent of children on waiting lists are 0 to 3 years old, largely
because those are the ages that require the most care personnel.
Long hours and crowded cities mean that a premium is placed on placing centers in ac-
cessible areas, especially near train stations to minimize parental travel time. But it is in
any case difficult to get land in big cities, and residents (especially older persons) often re-
sist efforts to build new centers because of the noise and inconvenience. Partly for these
reasons, governments have been pushing policies to ease rules and standards, notably
those governing staffing, minimum space, and play areas. Tokyo pioneered the use of
flexible standards allowing centers to be “semi-certified” (ninsho, essentially midway be-
tween licensed and unlicensed) even if they had no outdoor play area, as long as a park
was nearby (furthermore, the definition of “near” may be flexible).
While Japan years ago joined many European nations in seeking to use child care serv-
ices as part of a sort of family supply infrastructure to revive national birthrates, a dis-
tinctive feature of Japanese practice is strong emphasis on use of market forces to try
to achieve robust results at low cost. This has entailed extensive deregulation, especially
with regard to requirements for space and staffing. Since shortages are most severe in ma-
jor cities, where land in easily accessible areas is difficult to procure, there is strong incen-
tive to ease rules on space (minimum standards for space per child along with outdoor
play areas); such easing can make it far cheaper and easier for operators to open new facili-
ties. Staffing is generally by far the most expensive cost component, often seventy per-
cent of the total. The financial incentives are very clear for governments suffering impla-
cable financial difficulties (meaning the central government along with virtually every
“local government” (jichitai) in Japan). In Fuchi City in Tokyo, for example, private
Child Care in Japan: The Changing Political Context 67
operators can, incredibly, provide operate a facility serving around one hundred children
for about half what the local government would pay out, or anyway so the competitive
bids would seem to indicate (Kobayashi 2015:102). As a result, there has been a sharp
rise in the ratio of private sector operators over the past two decades. Moreover, new gov-
ernment policies have steadily made it easier for operators to achieve the much-desired
status of licensed provider. In some cases, local governments press operators to become li-
censed, mainly so that waiting lists can be reduced (only children waiting for entrance
into licensed centers count).
However, the non-financial costs have been high, and have only recently come to be
widely recognized (although knowledgeable observers of the child care industry and vari-
ous activists have pointed out, and often resisted, these trends for years). The core prob-
lem of private sector operators is that they seek to earn profits, creating some undesir-
able incentives. They often appeal to parents by using dubious marketing devices, some-
times emphasizing less important benefits of their facilities such as English teaching, of-
ten while neglecting more important factors such as competence of staff in child care
itself. The more dangerous problems include neglect of basic standards and poor treat-
ment of staff. Private operators such as JP Holdings have expanded rapidly as the govern-
ment’s incentives have improved in the past decade, but they have been suspected of sys-
tematic neglect of basic quality and safety measures. Especially damaging is constant
loss (or under-use) of experienced veteran staff. Furthermore, with cost-cutting ram-
pant, according to critics, these problems are increasingly evident in the public sector as
well, if less damagingly.
Researchers have established that Japan produces plenty of qualified childcare work-
ers in its array of specialty or vocational schools (senmon gakko), junior colleges, and uni-
versities, but high turnover means persistent labor shortages (Kakiuchi et al 2015). Em-
ployment conditions for childcare workers are generally poor. In 2016, it has come to be
commonly reported that childcare workers earn a monthly average of ￥219,000, more
than ￥100,000 lower than the overall industry average of ￥333,000 1). The low pay, cou-
pled with the physically and emotionally taxing nature of the job, result into high turn-
over. One consequence is a huge pool of so-called latent childcare workers, persons with
child care qualifications, and often child care experience as well, who are not working in
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1） Suzuki Wataru (2016) argues that the figure is misleading because it understates relatively
high wages paid to civil servant child care workers. However, local governments have been reduc-
ing their numbers for years in order to reduce personnel costs; see Kanbayashi (2012, 2015).
the industry. Their numbers are estimated at between 700,000 to 840,000. The govern-
ment has recently started offering financial incentives to draw them back.
In a survey conducted by MHLW in 2013, poor employment conditions were the main
reasons given by qualified child care workers for not working in the industry 2). The lead-
ing reason was low pay, at 47.5 percent; third was worry about the heavy responsibili-
ties or possibility of accidents, at 40 percent; fourth was concern about one’s own health,
at 39.1 percent; and fifth was concern about difficulty in taking break time, at 37 per-
cent. In the author’s own interviews over the years, child care workers tend to state that
they don’t really get to take breaks because there are barely enough staff to handle the
kids, and they have generally not been at the type of poorly run facilities described by
Kobayashi. The second main item in the 2013 survey was interest in other occupations,
at 43.1 percent, suggesting a different kind of problem, namely that other occupations
are also attractive to capable people, especially as barriers to professional jobs for
women break down. Retaining responsible caregivers is also important because, accord-
ing to numerous accounts, many childcare workers do not take their jobs seriously,
partly because of poor or indifferent leadership (e.g., Kobayashi 2015). Some childcare
workers, including mothers with experience raising their own children, simply do not un-
derstand how to handle children in an institutional setting.
Economist Suzuki Wataru (2016) argues that the costs of licensed child care service are
simply too low: the real cost of care in Tokyo is ￥150-200,000 per month, he observes,
but fees are in the ￥20-30,000 range, so local governments scramble to increase supply.
To be sure, large differentials in cost and quality between public and private operators
have long been regarded as a major weakness in the system, and, given the nation’s fis-
cal distress and need to raise taxes, it may make sense to reduce differences by increas-
ing the cost of licensed care (especially for higher income families, though this already oc-
curs to varying extents). But the author is not convinced that market-distorting low
costs per se are the problem - there is strong need for increased good-quality service,
quite apart from cost.
Of course, a problem longstanding in Japan, along with the US, is that voters are
very averse to paying taxes but unhappy when services are lacking or curtailed.
Inokuma recounts an anecdote about a woman in Saitama who complained to civil ser-
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2） Reported by Fukoin (2016). There were 958 respondents, conducted by Hello Work offices in ar-
eas with large waiting lists.
vants about not being able to get into a licensed child care center; the annoyed staff re-
sponded, You wanted komuin (civil servant) numbers reduced (Inokuma 2014:78).
Part 2 Politics of the Waiting List
The waiting list (taiki jido) has come to serve as the symbol of Japan’s child care prob-
lem, and the term has accordingly come to be quite politicized (Inokuma 2014: see espe-
cially Chapter 2). For years, under the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), child
care was largely neglected, especially since party’s conservative wing were largely con-
cerned with holding welfare costs and keeping women engaged in their traditional roles
as homemakers. The Angel Plan (1994) was the first serious effort at shifting the cost of
child from families to society. Reflecting the new policy priority of providing support to
prospective working mothers, the term waiting list was first officially reported in 1995.
But it was Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro who made waiting list an everyday term,
and his second successor as prime minister, Fukuda Yasuo (2007-08, following the semi-
disastrous first administration of Abe Shinzo in 2006-07), who raised the bar again with
an ambitious ten-year target (one reason, perhaps, why his support among women polled
much better than among men). In the late 2000s, the Democratic Party further upped
the ante by making strong pledges to help child-rearing families.
However, policymaking reality was different from the quasi-populist pledges, since at
the same time politicians were promising to improve services they were also pledging to
hold down tax burdens, especially through the populist measure of slashing public sector
employment, including child caregivers and persons in related areas such as food prepara-
tion. The Trinity cost-cutting policy agenda pushed by Koizumi reduced the amount of
money channeled from the central to regional and local governments, and indirectly en-
couraged the advance of privatization of child care services. In 2007, there were more chil-
dren in private than in public sector daycare centers for the first time. Furthermore,
there was a considerable jump in the number of families seeking to place children in day-
care centers following the Lehman Shock of late 2008. As is well known by now through-
out Japan, rising supply as well as more difficult economic conditions have stimulated ris-
ing demand, as more couples seek to place children in daycare so that both can work. In fis-
cal 2014, for example, spaces increased 146,000, but official MHLW waiting list also in-
creased by 1800. It is now established that real latent demand is some 80,000, although
one private sector think tank calculated the real demand at 1.71 million, figuring in
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many families who have wanted child care service but never applied (Nihon Keizai
Shinbun 2016.03.31).
Nevertheless, the stakes, along with parental expectations, had been raised, and many
local politicians were beginning to make eliminating waiting lists pieces of their elec-
toral agendas. Best known in this regard was probably Hayashi Fumiko, backed by the
LDP, who made eliminating the waiting list the main plank in her policy platform when
running for mayor of Yokohama City. She proceeded to achieve nationwide recognition
(and high praise from Abe) for eliminating the city’s waiting list in 2013 - except that
she eliminated it only on paper (Inokuma 2014: Chapter 1). The devil is in the definition
of the term, and how local governments actually interpret (or manipulate) it. For exam-
ple, many mothers raising small children will do job searches largely by internet, but
they went uncounted in Yokohama if they did not go to official the official Hello Work
job assistance centers. The City also declined to count children in Yokohama’s unlicensed
daycare centers that received subsidies (though the cost of those centers was still higher
and quality generally lower than in the licensed centers). In addition, children do not get
counted if parents refuse to consider appropriate centers recommended by officials, but
the definition of “appropriate” is malleable and varies by local government. The defini-
tion was simpler until 2005 - it was everyone who wanted into a licensed daycare center
but could not. However, as expectations rose and local governments came under increas-
ing pressure, the waiting list numbers became a source of embarrassment, so many local
governments began to fudge, most often by not counting people in unlicensed child care
centers that received any kind of subsidy, or by using a definition different from that of
MHLW. According to Inokuma, the resulting proliferation of dodgy accounting means
that accurate comparisons across areas has become impossible.
To be sure, Yokohama under Mayor Hayashi was doing much more than misleading
voters - it did indeed substantially, by more than 8,000, the number of children in day-
care. The city had proportionately few facilities compared to other major cities when
Hayashi took office, so there was considerable ground to be made up. Nevertheless, the
“elimination” was a fabrication that angered many observers. The mayor of Tokyo’s
huge Setagaya Ward, well known as the country’s taiki jido waasuto (the “worst” (larg-
est) waiting list), complained, since the ward reportedly does not fudge numbers, but
also draws strong criticism since its numbers consistently dwarf those of other local gov-
ernments.
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Part 3 Abe Shinzo and the Blog
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has made helping mothers get into the work force a cen-
tral pillar of his economic stimulus/reform agenda. His administration’s new agenda in-
cludes the Dynamic engagement of all citizens policy and the Law to Support Active
Women. Abe originally pledged to increase the number of slots in licensed centers by
400,000 in five years from fiscal year 2013. By end March 2015 (the end of fiscal 2014),
219,000 slots had been added - yet the waiting list grew as ambitious and optimistic pol-
icy proposals stimulated demand by encouraging more parents to seek slots. Abe re-
sponded by raising the stakes. In his proposal of November 2015 to encourage Dynamic en-
gagement of all citizens, he announced that an additional 100,000 slots would be created.
While the attention to the child care problem was naturally welcome, the proposal failed
to deal with the core problems pointed out above, including poor pay and employment con-
ditions, and low quality and standards in many centers. In addition, there were suspi-
cions that some of the Administration’s recent gender-friendly policies reflect a political
imperative to strengthen support among women rather than a sincere effort to improve
services for families and children.
Abe suddenly lost control over the national narrative in mid-February this year when
an angry blog struck a national nerve (Osaki 2016.03.07; Brasor 2016). Titled “Hoikuen
Ochita Nihon Shine!” (I couldn’t get day care! Drop dead, Japan!) and posted anony-
mously on a popular website, the message dispensed with the usual polite phrasing and
seethed with anger about the alleged failure of the Abe government keep promises to
help women work productively, and about the haughty treatment of local officials. (The
media later identified and contacted the writer, a mother in Tokyo in her 30s, for follow-
up discussion.) The blog stimulated political activity calling for an increase in daycare
services, including a rally in front of the Diet building on March 5 and an online peti-
tion that culminated with a group of mothers handing over 28,000 quickly gathered signa-
tures to Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki on March 9. In addition,
the issue helped catapult to quick fame Yamao Shiori, an opposition leader who used the
blog to confront and embarrass Abe in a February 29 televised Diet hearing. Newspaper
accounts differ, some suggesting that Abe was ill-informed and ill-prepared, but others
claiming that Yamao, perhaps a bit underhandedly, broke a common-practice agreement
not to reference a message filled with dirty language during a public or televised event.
経済学雑誌 第117巻 第 1号72
Regardless, Yamao emerged a winner from the encounter, being named policy chief of
the newly formed Democratic Party in late March (Japan Times 2016.03.25).
Abe and some other conservatives at first dismissed the blog, emphasizing that it was
anonymous and loaded with crude language - that was politically tone-deaf, since the
blogger was expressing the frustrations of tens of thousands of parents, some of whom
have lost jobs because of inability to place children in care. In any case, Abe further high-
lighted that his Administration had already enacted policies to enlarge child care facili-
ties and staffing. MHLW data show that 72,430 new child care slots were created in fis-
cal 2013 and 146,257 in fiscal 2014, actually surpassing the government’s goal of creating
200,000 slots in those two years. The fiscal 2016 budget draft proposes spending￥119.1 bil-
lion on child care, largely to open another 200,000 slots over two years. Despite these ef-
forts, the waiting list has hovered stubbornly high for the past several years; the 23,167
waiting children nationwide in April 2015 were up 1,796 from the previous year.
The political controversy nevertheless inspired a new round of policymaking efforts
(e.g., Ninomiya and Oda 2016). Abe announced on March 11 that he would establish a
task force to devise new measures, and the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito suggested
adding additional spending. “We should thoroughly enhance support measures for child-
rearing families in a bid to realize a virtuous cycle of growth and distribution,” stated
Abe that day at a meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Japan Times
2016.03.13), which was meeting to plan an agenda to boost Japan’s annual nominal gross
domestic product to ￥600 trillion. Some members of the Council suggested additional
measures to support child-rearing families, including making school lunches free and re-
ducing children’s medical expenses. “Applications for nursery schools have increased at a
pace faster than we can provide places for,” Abe responded on March 14 to questioning
in the Diet. “We will do our utmost to cut waiting lists to zero so that people can both
work and raise children” (Ninomiya and Oda 2016).
Abe clearly was concerned about political implications of the child care embarrass-
ment, especially with a summer Upper House election approaching, and his support
among women weak (see Asahi 2016.03.30:2). Abe’s male-female support gap has nearly al-
ways been large, generally around eight to ten points 3), presumably because women are
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3） In surveys going back twenty years, the male-female gap in his second (current) Government
is the worst, surpassing even that of Obuchi Keizo. Yet his first Government (2006-07) boasted
the highest gap in support of women over men, ahead of the next-ranked Fukuda and Noda gov-
ernments. See Nikkei (2016.04.17).
less likely than men to believe that Abenomics has revived the economy, and because
they oppose the Abe Administration’s efforts to strengthen the military and revise the
Constitution (Nikkei 2016.04.17). Even before the blog-triggered controversy, the Abe Ad-
ministration had been trying new ways, including social media and regional meetings,
to convince women that they were benefiting from recent policies (Asahi 2016.04.17:12).
In response to rising criticism, on March 24, the LDP announced an emergency proposal
that included ￥17.7 billion for fiscal 2016, largely to raise childcare worker wages 1.9 per-
cent, or ￥6,000 a month. One goal was to bring latent childcare workers back to the
field. On March 24, Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, called for raising pay for child-
care workers by about 4 percent. Komeito wants to use improved child care and higher
pay for the workers as means to alleviate women’s unhappiness about its role in support-
ing new military policies in 2015.
Hoping to capitalize on women’s annoyances with the Government, the Democratic
Party, last September, established a new political school to deal with women’s concerns,
and on March 15 this year started up the Wait List Emergency Headquarters. The party
(which merged with Ishin no Kai in March to form the Minshinto, still called Demo-
cratic Party (DP) in English) has joined other opposition parties in calling for a huge
￥50,000 per month pay increase for childcare workers. Suzuki Wataru argues against
the proposal on the grounds that it would raise wages not only in big cities where wait-
ing list are long, but in regions where there is no waiting list; he observes also that it
does not deal with related occupations such as cooks and medical staff. Leaving aside for
now the question of whether regional staff also deserve raises, Suzuki’s points under-
score the suspicion that the opposition party demand is less carefully formulated than po-
litically opportunistic. The Democratic Party evinced little concern for care workers dur-
ing its three and one-half years in office from 2009. Furthermore, it continued the LDP’s
policy of reducing public sector employment, necessitating the creation of more low-paid
non-regular child care positions in the public sector to replace the declining ranks of regu-
lar workers (Kanbayashi 2012). As a result, non-regular ratios in the public sector are es-
pecially high for child care workers (52.9 percent according to a recent government sur-
vey) and for Gakudo (elementary school age) care workers (92.8 percent). Not only are
these workers poorly compensated, but all are on time-limited contracts, which often can-
not be renewed. (Although local governments conclude the contracts, the central govern-
ment strongly influences shaping and enforcement of rules, and it has been pressing lo-
cal governments not to extend job security to non-regular civil servants.) Hence, even as
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the Japanese government seeks to keep more people in the profession, it is also forcing
many out, or at least making it difficult for them to keep working continuously.
In any case, the Abe Administration, along with its sudden decision to raise wages, is
continuing the core policy of aggressive deregulation, especially by lowering standards
to increase capacity. Beginning April 2016, minimum staffing ratios were reduced by one-
third, and elementary school and yochien (roughly kindergarten) qualifications could be
used to obtain child care posts (Yomiuri 2016.03.21). The Administration is encouraging lo-
cal governments to raise the limits on numbers of children in small-sized centers (which
handle exclusively infants up to two years of age) from 19 to 22, and to lower space and
staffing standards in line with the lower national minimum standards. For example, for
one- to two-year-old children, Tokyo’s Setagaya Ward requires at least one caregiver for
every five children, while the national minimum standard is one for every six children.
Since there are 2,184 authorized daycare centers in Tokyo, the government calculates
that if each facility would accept one additional child, the number of children on waiting
lists in the Japanese capital would decrease some 30 percent. However, many local govern-
ments have higher standards precisely because it is widely believed that the national mini-
mum standards are far too low to protect children’s health and development. Along with
the central government, Osaka Prefecture is pushing deregulation in an effort to revive
economic growth, especially by using its status as a tokku (special economic zone) mod-
ify regulations to quickly eliminate its waiting list and reduce facility shortages. Gover-
nor Matsui Ichiro has proposed a major weakening of standards to Regional Economic Re-
vival Minister Ishiba Shigeru.
Part 4 The Child Care Worker Problem
Along with overall supply, quality of care and worker conditions have increasingly be-
come major issues. This is significant in two respects. First, Japan has long had the repu-
tation for having excellent child care service, but some reports are now questioning qual-
ity, even in licensed centers, especially by tying it to rapid expansion, neglect of worker in-
terests, and the increasing role of private providers. Second, the employment conditions
of childcare workers have long been overlooked, although it has been clear that most are
underpaid and virtually all overworked.
As Kakiuchi Kunimitsu and his collaborators emphasize, childcare workers generally
have low social standing and earn low wages (Kakiuchi et al 2015). Their employment
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problems have long been overlooked by researchers as well as the public, and there is not
even a comprehensive national survey of childcare workers and their employment condi-
tions. The image of childcare workers may have suffered because some are civil servants,
who sometimes come in for bashing in Japan (notably about a decade ago). At that time,
it was sometimes misleadingly suggested that childcare workers were overpaid, though
regular (and relatively well-paid) civil servants account for only a portion of the work
force.
Kobayashi Miki (2015), a journalist specializing in youth and women’s labor issues,
uses extensive interviews with parents, caregivers, center managers, and other persons in-
volved in the child care industry to sketch a portrait of a distressed system in a new
book. She launches especially harsh criticism at private companies, portraying them as
committed to profit and disinterested in the wellbeing of employees, families, children,
or society at large. One licensed center, for example, nominally meets the requirements
for space, but fills one room with so many shelves and supplies that the most of the
space is unusable for care. Many centers have no outdoors space to play in (in principle,
the children can play in parks, but understaffing means that moving them between park
and center can be nerve-wracking, or simply does not happen). In another case, a dili-
gent daycare worker bought games and equipment out of her own pocket, and borrowed
books from a library on her own time, since the center provided almost nothing
(Kobayashi 2015: 63).
Kobayashi’s interviews and research suggest that the emphasis on profit and cost-
cutting means that experience is not appreciated, even though experience is regarded by
child care professionals as essential to quality (and safe) care. So is maintaining a bal-
anced age ladder, partly so younger workers can handle more of the most strenuous activi-
ties, but also to ensure that skills and knowledge get transmitted from one cohort to the
next. Not only do private firms handle workers as disposable, argues Kobayashi, they
are probably quietly pleased when veterans depart, along with their higher seniority- or
experience-based pay packages (though these never rise high in the private sector). They
rarely trouble themselves to ensure stable staffing, and often shift workers around to
minimize staffing. They at times call on ordinary untrained agency temporaries.
The mainstream media has recently begun to report that child care industry pay is
low, and that work conditions are poor as well. According to a 2014 Tokyo survey, re-
ported by Kobayashi (p. 55), 16 percent of childcare workers think about quitting, with
the figure higher in private operations. The leading reasons are, in order, pay and
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workloads. Another survey indicates that nearly all childcare workers feel fatigue. Profes-
sional qualifications provide little insulation. In one of Kobayashi’s examples (p. 78-83), a
nurse served in a private child care chain center, enabling the company draw an allow-
ance from the government by having a medical worker on the premises. However, the cen-
ter was so badly understaffed that she not only worked alongside the regular child care
providers, possibly neglecting her own nursing duties, but went to work early every day
to clean the toilets (the company declines to hire cleaners, adding to the caregivers’ work-
loads).
In a grim irony, so-called matahara (maternity harassment) is apparently common in
child care centers. Kobayashi uses survey data from left-wing national labor federation
Zenroren along with a flood of data from one of her earlier books to indicate that Japa-
nese childcare workers suffer a distressingly disproportionate level of miscarriage and pre-
mature birth (Kobayashi 2015:71). This largely occurs because of excess workloads,
along with pressure to continue working too late into pregnancy (dedication to their
young charges is easily manipulated by employers and uncaring superiors).
Several researchers have provided further data on the problems, especially through a re-
cent large-scale survey of work conditions in Hokkaido (Kawamura 2015). 2,381 persons
(97 percent of them women) responded. As throughout Japan, conditions varied greatly be-
tween large cities, such as Sapporo, and smaller or regional cities. The latter generally
had fewer children than their limits, while overcapacity (including over eighty percent of
private centers) was the norm in large cities. There were the usual large wage differen-
tials between regular and non-regular caregivers. (Interestingly, the respondents in-
cluded both individual childcare workers and center managers, and the latter were consis-
tently more negative or pessimistic than the workers.) The survey indicated that there is
rising demand for more services (such as extended care hours) and higher quality, includ-
ing closer contact with parents and with schools, but that heavier workloads make it
hard to carry out those tasks. Furthermore, new guidelines are supposed to enhance pro-
fessionalism by, for example, encouraging more systematic skill development and record
keeping; however, given the inadequacy of staffing, then, the new guidelines risk worsen-
ing real conditions by increasing workloads. The survey finds that eighty percent of
child care center managers believe that burdens on their workers have increased
(Kawamura 2015:94-5).
The rapid opening of new centers makes matters worse. Often, parents cannot really
check out a new center because construction or renovation may continue up to the last
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moment, or because staff are not yet hired (or have yet to be reassigned from other work-
places). Moreover, many private centers are allegedly run by managers with no child
care experience (or concern). In one case described by Kobayashi (2015:91), a mere two
weeks before opening, the new care leaders and the manager for a corporate-run center
had yet to be chosen, so other employees filled in during interviews with parents. In
other cases, childcare workers have turned over before a center has even started up. In an-
other dispiriting instance, a mother recounted that the manager had atrocious communi-
cation skills; she soon found out that at least part of the problem was that he totally
lacked experience, but had been rushed into a center management position virtually unpre-
pared because the chain was opening centers so quickly (Kobayashi 2015:21-27).
The press to increase supply means that standards are almost certainly still falling. Par-
ents had long assumed that licensing meant that quality and safety were assured, but
many have been surprised to learn that even licensed daycare centers may be seriously un-
derstaffed, with official inspections far too few to catch serious problems (Nakamura
2016.05.02). Critics have long noted that understaffing is rife throughout the national
and local bureaucracies, making safety-related inspections largely ineffective. One unusu-
ally candid daycare center manager related his frustrations to Kobayashi (pp. 35-36) at be-
ing pressured to accept far more children than his facilities could properly handle (“we’ve
get them sleeping in the halls”). Subsidies present another problem, since the temptation
to abuse is high, particularly given lack of inspection staff. In a recent scandal, a family-
run quasi-private (shakai fukushi hojin) center passed subsidy money to family mem-
bers, who were not really working, instead of the caregivers (Maeda 2016). One implica-
tion is not only that the money is wasted, but that subsidies may lure into child care the
type of unscrupulous people most likely to endanger kids through neglect, even if they
are not overtly abusive.
To deal with the excess demand, local governments generally use point systems to try
to rank families by need, but the system is notoriously rigid. It tries to give priority in
placement and choice to families according to obvious need, such as having two working
spouses or being low-income, but the criteria in practice often produces perverse results.
They frequently disadvantage people in serious need of assistance, notably the numerous
working persons classified as self-employed (Kobayashi 2015:34-36; Osaki 2016.04.17).
Some self-employed are virtual employees deliberately mis-classified by employers seek-
ing to hold down social insurance costs, while some professionals working freelance
(such as photographers) may have irregular incomes, making them suspect to officials.
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The point system also favors families in which both spouses are regular employees over
those with one regular and one non-regular - economically, the priority should seem-
ingly be reversed. (To be fair to local officials, many of them overworked, the heavy de-
mand probably means that no system can be equitable.) Another problem is that parents
are sometimes counseled to game the system. In one case, local officials told a mother
she had little chance to get into a licensed center, and counseled placing her young child
in an unlicensed facility for a year (Osaki 2016.04.17). “They told me spending a year at
noncertified day care would earn me 42 points, without which I apparently couldn’t even
compete with other moms,” she said. “But isn’t it crazy the ward takes it for granted
that our children first need to enroll in day care that doesn’t meet normal standards?”
Although the Abe Government is emphasizing its support for working women - includ-
ing a newly proclaimed commitment to equal work for equal pay - and for child-rearing
families, it has continued official policies that perpetuate the core problems. One of the
most troubling is that of steadily reducing the ranks of regular civil servants, who are re-
placed in turn by low-paid insecure non-regular public sector employees, many of them
daycare workers (Kanbayashi 2012; Kobayashi 2015:82-83). In many public sector daycare
centers, over half of the caregivers are now non-regular. This practice is not only unfair
but inefficient. Since non-regular caregivers are typically excluded from meetings, they of-
ten lack the information to perform their tasks properly. Some non-regular workers are
veterans who are returning to the workplace, but do not want to work full time (often be-
cause of the poor work conditions). Not only is pay bad, but one survey suggests that vet-
erans working as non-regular child care workers often quit because of dissatisfaction
about being relegated to doing zatsuyo (errands; or routine and menial tasks), not to men-
tion lack of any voice to improve subpar practices they had to observe.
Conclusion
Critics commonly allege that child care policy is increasingly driven by numbers: the
government uses deregulation and various stop-gap measures to reduce the increasingly
embarrassing waiting lists, while private operators are only concerned about profits.
That creates a double-pronged assault on quality and even safety. In this sense, the
rapid growth being pressed by the current Abe Administration may be creating prob-
lems for the future.
Arguably, however, the greater problem is the failure to resolve longstanding
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employment problems, especially long work hours and obstacles to taking childcare
leave. If these problems could be relieved, the current child care supply problems would
be greatly alleviated. In addition, the government needs both to tighten regulation of pri-
vate operators, and to end its own discriminatory employment practices, which relegate
thousands of childcare workers to low pay and anxiety about future employment. Reform-
ing some basic employment practices would greatly improve life chances for many chil-
dren.
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